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UNITED

STATES-MENTAL

HEALTH-THE

"BILL

OF RIGHTS"

OF

THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED ASSISTANCE AND BILL OF RIGHTS

ACT DID NOT CREATE SUBSTANTIVE

RIGHTS FOR THE MENTALLY

RETARDED TO APPROPRIATE TREATMENT IN THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
ENVIRONMENT

Plaintiffs' alleged that conditions at the Pennhurst State
3
School and Hospital 2 were unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous.
The residents of Pennhurst contended that they were denied due
process and equal protection of the law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment; 4 suffered cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth 5 and fourteenth amendments; 6 and were
denied rights given by the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
1. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981). The present case is a
consolidation of five cases. Terri Lee Halderman, a minor retarded resident of Pennhurst, sued on
behalf of herself and all other Pennhurst residents. Defendants included Pennhurst, its
superintendent, and various Commonwealth of Pennsylvania officials. Intervening plaintiffs
included other mentally retarded persons, the United States, and the Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Citizens (PARC). Several surrounding counties were added as defendants by PARC and
Halderman, who alleged that the counties were responsible for commitments to Pennhurst and for
the lack of community facilities. Id at 1534.
2. Id. Pennhurst is an institution for the mentally retarded in Pennsylvania. It has
approximately 1,200 residents. Seventy-five percent of the residents have an IQ of less than 35, and
are classified as severely or profoundly retarded. Some are also physically handicapped. Id.
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV. This amendment states in part as follows:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. S1.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This amendment states as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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and Bill of Rights Act, 7 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 and the
7. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). The Pennhurst residents particularly
emphasized section 6010, the "Bill of Rights" provision of the Act. Section 6010 provides:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with
developmental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate
treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with
developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental
potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least
restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to
assure that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other
residential program for persons with developmental disabilities that(A) does not provide treament, services, and habilitation which is
appropriate to the needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards:
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the
persons with developmental disabilities being served by the
program.
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient
medical and dental services.
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on such
persons unless absolutely necessary and prohibition of the use of
such restraint as a punishment or as a substitute for a
habilitation program.
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints
on uch persons and the use of such restraints as punishment or
as a substitute for a habilitation program or in quantities that
interfere with services, treatment, or habilitation for such
persons.
(v) Permission for close relatives of such persons to visit
them at reasonable hours without prior notice.
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as
may be promulgated by the Secretary.
(4) All programs for persons with developmental disabilities should meet
standards which are designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for
those served, and(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons in need of
comprehensive health-related, habilitative, or rehabilitative services,
which are at least equivalent to those standards applicable to
intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded promulgated in
regulations of the Secretary on.January 17, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg. pt. II),
as appropriate when taking into account the size of the institutions and
the service delivery arrangements of the facilities of the programs;
(B) in the case of other residential programs for persons with
developmental disabilities, which assure that care is appropriate to the
needs of the persons being served by such programs, assure that the
persons admitted to facilities of such programs are persons whose needs
can be met through services provided by such facilities, and assure that
the facilities under such programs provide for the humane care of the
residents of the facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and
(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which assure the care
provided by such programs is appropriate to the persons served by the
programs. The rights of persons with developmental disabilities
described in findings made in this section are in addition to any
constitutional or other rights otherwise afforded to all persons.

Id.

6010 (West Supp. 1981) (amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 6010 (West 1977)).
8. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981). The Pennhurst residents particularly
relied on what is known as section 504 of the Act. At the time of trial, section 504 provided as follows:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subiected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id. § 794 (West 1975) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504 87 Stat. 35).
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Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. 9
The planitiffs sought damages and equitable relief, including the
closing of Pennhurst, and the establishment of community living
arrangements for its residents. 10 The district court entered a
judgment for the plaintiffs, 1 and the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit substantially affirmed. 12 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and held that the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (Act) does not create for
the mentally retarded any substantive rights to appropriate
treatment in the "least restrictive" environment. 13 Pennhurst State
School &Hospitalv. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §5 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969). The Pennhurst residents relied on
section 4201 of the Act, which provides in part:
The department shall have power, and its duty shall be:
(1) To assure within the State the availability and equitable provision of adequate
mental health and mental retardation services for all persons who need them,
regardless of religion, race, color, natural origin, settlement, residence, or economic
or social status.
Id. S 4201.
10. 101 S. Ct. at 1534. Community living arrangements have been recognized as an important
element in.the habilitation of the retarded. They are community-based, homelike residences which
emphasize a more normal life style for the -etardec. Community living arrangements are seen as a
preferable alternative to institutionalization in a facility which, by its nature, is large, impersonal,
and unable to meet the needs of the individual residents. Id. n. 1. See also Mason & Menolascino, The
Right to Treatment for Mentally RetardedCitizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 124, 139-43 (1976).
11. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
district court issued findings of fact which were not disputed on appeal. Pennhurst did not meet
minimum standards for the habilitation of its residents. It was overcrowded and understaffed, which
led to the excessive use of drugs and physical restraints to control the residents. The environment at
Pennhurst was found to have led to the deterioration of skills of the residents, as well as to the
physical abuse (both through self-abuse and abuse by the staff) of the residents. Id. at 1308. The
court concluded that the mentally retarded have constitutional rights to minimally adequate
habilitation, to be free from harm, and to nondiscriminatory habilitation. Id. at 1314-22. The court
believed minimally adequate habilitation included the type of assistance necessary to allow the
retarded to acquire as many life skills as their capabilities permitted. The court saw a constitutional
mandate to achieve this habilitation in an environment that was the least restrictive, in light of the
individual's needs. Id. at 1319. The court also concluded that the mentally retarded have statutory
rights to minimally adequate habilitation through the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act and statutory rights to nondiscriminatory habilitation through the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at 1322-24 (construing 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1975)).
The court ordered that Pennhurst eventually be closed, that community living arrangements be
provided for the mentally retarded residents of Pennhurst and those on the waiting list, that
individual habilitation plans be developed, and that conditions at Pennhurst be improved. A Special
Master was appointed to supervise the implementation or the order. Id. at 1302-08, 1314-29.
12. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third
Circuit chose not to address the constitutional issues. Instead, it based its decision upon an
interpretation of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. Id. at 95
(construing 42 U.S.C.A. §5 6001-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)). The court found that the Bill of
Rights section of the Act, section 6010, provided the mentally retarded with a right to treatment and
habilitation in the least restrictive environment. Id. at 97, 107. The court found that this right could
be enforced through private action. The court also found that the state statute granted a right to
habilitation, and that the plaintiffs could enforce that right in federal court. Id. at 103. The court
affirmed the relief ordered by the district court, with the. exception of the order to close Pennhurst.
Id. at 116. Instead of closing Pennhurst, the circuit court ordered that individual assessments be
made of the needs of each resident, with a presumption made in favor of community living
arrangements. Id. at 95-100, 103-07.
13. 101 S. Ct. at 1547. The Court found that Congress had not indicated an intent to impose
through the Act affirmative funding obligations on the states pursuant to the enforcement provision
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The history of the treatment of the mentally retarded 14 reveals
changes that have occurred as the philosophy regarding retardation
has changed. 15 In colonial times the retarded were frequently
incarcerated with the misfits of society: the criminal, the deviant,
and the poor. 16 In the early 1800's the mentally retarded began to
be seen as persons who could develop skills in a highly structured
environment.' 7 Early American institutions thus emphasized the
development of skills that would enhance the independence of the
retarded.

11

In the late 1800's the eugenics movement

9

developed and the

of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1540. Nor had Congress unambiguously conditioned receipt of
money under the Act on compliance with the Act's provisions, as required under the spending power
clause. Id. Thus, the Court found that Congress was merely expressing a preference that the states
should provide appropriate treatment in the "least restrictive" environment. Id. at 1546-47.
14. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 124 n. 1. Mental retardation was defined in 1973 by
the American Association on Mental Deficiency: "Mental retardation refers to significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and
manifested in the developmental period." Id. (quoting H. GROSSMAN, MANUAL OF TERMINOLOGY
AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAl. RETARDATION 5 (1973)).

Intellectual functioning is determined from performance on standardized intelligence tests. The
general categorization is as follows:
Stanford-Binet Test Score (IQ)
Level qfRetardation
52-67
Mild
Moderate
36-51
20-35
Severe
Below 20
Profound
Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 124 n. 1.
15. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 130. In a comparison of attitudes toward the
retarded in the 19th and 20th centuries, the following has been noted:
The 19th Century initially witnessed the recognition of mental retardation as a
condition in which the intellectual faculties have never developed sufficiently: the
introduction and vigorous pursuit of a rational plan for "educating the minds of
idiots." . . . As the 20th Century approachied, the ascendency of the defect position in
professional thinking became associated with waning hopes for the education of the
retarded. The previous focus of sheltering the retarded from society was drastically
altered to one of protecting society from the retarded.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
16. Herr, Civil Rihts, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 CIN. L. REV. 679, 694 (1974). The
brutal conditions of the incarceration have been described as follows:
Regarded as sub-human beings they were chained in specially designed kennels and
cages like wild beasts and thrown into prisons, bridewells and jails like criminals. They
were incarcerated in workhouse dungeons, or made to slave as able-bodied paupers,
unclassified from the rest. They were left to wander about stark naked, driven from
place to place like mad dogs, subjected to whippings as vagrants and rogues. Even the
well-to-do were not spared confinement in strong rooms ano celler Isic) dungeons,
while legislation usually concerned itself more with their property than their person.
Id. at 695 (quoting A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 53 (2d ed. 1949)).
17. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 128. The impetus for the development of a method
to increase the skills of the retarded was the result of the work of a French psychiatrist, Jean-Marc
Gaspard hard. hard worked for five years with a severely retarded adolescent boy and, with a
"creative, humanistic, and highly structured approach," achieved improvements in skills such as
walking, feeding, dressing, toileting, and language development. Id.
18. Id. Although the effort was short-lived, a need was seen for the establishment of school-like
institutions for the retarded. See Herr, supra note 16, at 695.
19. Herr, supra note 16, at 696. Eugenics is the "scientific" improvement of the human race
through the elimination of undesirable traits. The retarded became a particular focus for the
eugenics movement after a study by Henry H. Goddard concluded that retardation was a fixed
genetic disorder. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 132.
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retarded were perceived as a threat to society."" "Warehousing"
the retarded in institutions as a means of protecting society
continued until the 1960's.21 The retarded were viewed in one of
several ways: as subhuman organisms, menaces, objects of pity,
eternal children, or diseased organisms. 22 Not until the 1960's,
after being urged by specialists to treat the retarded normally, did
professionals return to the concept that the mentally retarded could
develop skills which would enable them to function as
23
independently as possible in society.
As attitudes toward the mentally retarded began to change,
the courts were used to define the rights of the retarded. 24 Support
for court redefinition of the rights of the retarded initially came
26
25
from court decisions regarding the mentally ill. Rouse v. Cameron
20. Herr, supra note 16, at 696. The retarded were felt to be the cause of many social problems
and an effort was made to locate, institutionalize, and sterilize all the retarded so that the "American
way oflife" could be preserved. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 131 n. 17.
In 1927 the North Dakota Legislature enacted a statute which provided that the superintendent
of the State Hospital for the Feeble-Minded should report to the state board of medical examiners the
names of "all feeble-minded, insane, epileptic, habitual criminals, moral degenerates and sexual
perverts, who are potential to produce off-spring, who, because of inheritance of inferior or antisocial
traits, would probably become a social menace or wards of the State." 1927 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
263, § 1. Further, the statute provided as follows:
[Ilf, in the judgment of the entire board, procreation by any such person would
produce children with an inherited tendency, to feeble- mindedness, insanity, epilepsy,
criminality or degeneracy, and there is no probability that the condition of such person
so examined will improve to such an extent as to render procreation by any such
person advisable, or if the physical or mental condition of any such person will be
substantially improved thereby, then it shall be the duty of said Board after such
examination and hearing to make an order requiring such person to be sterilized.
Id. § 3 (codified at N.D. REV. CoDE § 23-0806 (1943) (repealed 1965)).
21. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 132-33. The emphasis on the need to protect society
resulted in the construction of ever larger institutions. Id. at 132.
22. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 130-31 (1979).
The retarded who were viewed as subhuman organisms were given minimal freedom and managed
as animals. The retarded who were viewed as a menace were contained and isolated to protect
society. When the retarded were seen as an object of pity, the goal became to keep them content, but
there was no recognition of a need to treat them with respect or dignity. The retarded who were
viewed as eternal children were kept happy, but were also overprotected and given no opportunity
to mature. Those who were viewed as diseased organisms were subjected to indefinite custodial care
in an effort to provide the perceived needed treatment and hospitalization. Id.
23. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 136. The principle of normalization has become the
basis of program strategies that call for the retarded to participate as normally as possible in the
community. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN
AND THE LAW 499-514 (1976).
24. See Henkin v. South Dakota Dep't of Social Servs., 498 F. Supp. 659 (D.S.D. 1980)
(mentally retarded person has a federal statutory right to appropriate treatment and service);
Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), aft'd, 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979)
(mentally retarded person has substantive rights under Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act which are privately enforceable); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (consent decree regarding institution for mentally
retarded included concept of constitutional right to protection from harm); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F.
Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977)
(mentally retarded have constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment in the least restrictive
environment); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
reserved in part, sub noam, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mentally retarded have
constitutional right to adequate habilitation).
25. See, e.g., O'Connor v, Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (stating that "a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely
in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends").
26. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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was the first decision to imply that there may be a constitutional
right to treatment in an institution for the mentally ill.27 The Rouse
court decided that there was a statutory right to treatment for those
involuntarily committed, following an acquittal by reason of
insanity.2 8 However, the noteworthy portion of the opinion was
Judge Bazelon's suggestion in dictum that lack of treatment might
violate constitutional standards of due process, equal protection,
29
and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
In the 1970's the United States Supreme Court decided two
cases that lent credence to the idea that a constitutional right to
treatment existed. 30 In Jackson v. Indiana31 the Court noted that
"due process requires that the nature and duration of a
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
3 the
which a person is committed. "32 In O'Connor v. Donaldson1
Court declined to decide whether involuntarily committed mentally
ill persons have a right to treatment. 34 The Court, however, did
state that "[in short, a State cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members or friends."s
The first major case regarding the right of the mentally
27. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Rouse was accused of a
misdemeanor and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to a hospital for the
mentally ill. Although the maximum criminal penalty was a one year sentence, Rouse had been in
the mental hospital four years at the time of the circuit court decision. Id. at 452.
28. Id.at 455.
29. Id. at 453. Other states have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., People v, Feagley, 14
Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975) (indefinite commitment with inadequate
treatment is cruel and unusual punishment).
30. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (due process requires nature and duration of
commitment bear reasonable relation to purpose for commitment); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975) (state cannot constitutionally confine nondangerous person capable of surviving
safely in freedom).
31. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The case involved the pretrial commitment of a deaf mute who was
found to have the mental ability of a preschool child. After testimony that the defendant would not be
able to understand the charges against him, the defendant was ordered committed until he could be
certified as sane. The Court upheld the argument that this amounted to a life sentence without a
conviction, and was, therefore, a violation of due process and equal protection rights. Idat 730, 738.
32. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738. The Jackson Court held that a person "who is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he
will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future." Id.

33. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
34. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). Donaldson was civilly committed and
confined as a mental patient in Florida. He was kept there for almost 15 years, despite repeated
attempts to seek release. Donaldson brought suit against the hospital superintendent and other
hospital staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of liberty. The circuit court found the
fourteenth amendment guaranteed a right to treatment for involuntarily civilly committed mental
patients. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S.

563 (1975).
35. 422 U.S. at 576. The Court concluded that committment could not be used to ensure a
higher standard of living for the person confined. Nor could the state commit a harmless mentally ill
person simply to save other citizens from exposure to those who act differently. Id. at 575.
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retarded to treatment 36 in the "least restrictive" environment was
Wyatt v. Stickney. 37 In Wyatt the district court set standards that
would ensure constitutionally acceptable habilitation for the
retarded. 38 The Wyatt decision was one the district court in
Pennhurst relied upon when it found a constitutional right to
39
minimally adequate habilitation.
The United States Supreme Court's first opportunity to
address the question of whether a constitutional right to minimally
adequate habilitation exists came in Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman.40 The Court, however, chose not to decide the case on
a constitutional basis. 4t Instead, the Court focused on
42
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.

the

The residents of Pennhurst argued that section 6010 of the Act
was enacted as an enforcement provision of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution and that it was,
therefore, mandatory on the states. 43 The Court noted that
36. The terms "treatment" and "habilitation" have been used interchangeably in cases dealing
with the retarded. The term "habilitation" is, however, more accurate because the retarded need
education and training, not the medical treatment with an eye towards a cure which the mentally ill
receive. See Halderman v, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
37. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The Wyatt litigation involved disputes over the
treatment of both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded in Alabama. Id. at 782. Subsequent
history of Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
qrff'd in part, remanded in part, reserved in part, sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
38. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The court developed
detailed standards for the institutions to follow. The standards from Wyatt included the following:
(1) [Al statement of the least restrictive habilitation conditions necessary to achieve the
purposes of commitment; (2) a description of intermediate and long-range habilitation
goals, with a projected timetable for their attainment; (3) a statement and rationale for
the plan of habilitation for achieving these intermediate and long-range goals; (4) a
specification of staff responsibility and a description of proposed staff involvement with
the patient in order to attain these habilitation goals; (5) criteria for release to less
restrictive habilitation conditions; and (6) criteria for discharge.
Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 150 (citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 397-99
(M.D. Ala. 1972)).
39. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1317-18. The Wyatt court
found a violation of the due process rights of the mentally retarded residents of Partlow. "Because
the only constitutional justification for civilly committing a mental retardate, therefore, is
habilitation, it follows ineluctably that once committed such a person is possessed of an inviolable
constitutional right to habilitation." 344 F. Supp. at 390.
40. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
41. Id. at 1536. The Supreme Court followed the lead of the circuit court and based its decision
on an interpretation of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. Although
neither the district court nor the parties had relied on the Act, the circuit court had requested
supplemental briefs on the issue and it was fully briefed before the Supreme Court. Id. at 1535 n.3.
42. Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 6001-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
43. 101 S. Ct. at 1538. The Third Circuit found that section 6010 was enacted as an
enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. The court relied on Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673 (1977), which found that the fourteenth amendment protected a right to be free from
"unjustified intrusions on personal security." The Third Circuit found that section 6010 was
enacted to prevent state intrusions into the disabled's personal security. 612 F.2d at 98 & n.5.
"Thus, in providing specific guarantees for a particular affected group, Congress' action is
consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of the broad underlying right protected against
impairment by the state through the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 98.
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Congress must expressly state any intent to legislatively enforce the
fourteenth amendment. 4 4 The Court expressed particular concern

that an explicit intent be found when the thrust of a legislative
action places an affirmative obligation on the states to fund
services. 45 The Court was unable to discover any explicit intent in
either the language of the Act or the legislative history. 46
While analyzing the language, structure, and history of the
Act, the Court noted that it appeared to be a "mere federal-state
funding statute." ' 47 The Court saw section 6010 as simply an
expression of congressional preference, intended only as
encouragement for the states to provide better services for the
mentally retarded. 4 8 The Court thus rejected the argument that
section 6010 was enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment (the enforcement provision), and therefore determined
that section 6010 did not create substantive rights to appropriate
treatment in the least restrictive enviroment. 49
The Court next addressed the issue of whether section 6010
was enacted pursuant to the spending clause of the United States
Constitution.5 ° The Court characterized legislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power as "much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions."'5' As with any contract, an
offeror must be unambiguous about the terms of the contract so
that there can be a knowing acceptance. 52 The Court analyzed
44. 101 S. Ct. at 1539. In other decisions regarding Congress's power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment there have been express articulations of legislative intent. See Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966) (intent stated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970) (intent stated in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976) (intent stated in House and Senate Reports of the 1972 Amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
45. 101 S. Ct. at 1539. The Court wanted to avoid a finding that Congress acted under the
enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment when such a finding would involve the
imposition of"massive financial obligations on the States." Id.
46. Id. at 1540. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that comments by Senators during
debate over the Senate's Bill of Rights provision indicated an intent to enforce the fourteenth
amendment. The Senate Bill included "over 400 pages of detailed standards." Id. at 1541. The
Senate Bill, however, was rejected by the Conference Committee and the "findings" of section 6010
were adopted. Id. at 1541-42.
47. Id. at 1540. The Court saw no intent on the part of Congress to fund new substantive rights
even though section 6010 speaks in terms of rights. The Court chose to determine legislative intent
through an overall analysis of the Act instead of focusing on only one section. Id.
48. Id. at 1540-41. The Court stated, "The closest one can come in giving 5 6010 meaning is
that it justifies and supports Congress' appropriation of money under the Act and guides the
Secretary in his review of state applications for federal funds." Id. The dissent also concluded that
section 6010 was not enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1549 (White,
Marshall & Brennan,.JI., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1540.
50. Id. at 1542.
51. Id. at 1539.
52. Id. at 1539-40. The Court's inquiry was thus directed to whether Congress specifically
imposed an obligation on the states as a condition of receiving federal funds, or whether Congress
merely advised the states to fund certain rights. Id. at 1540.
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whether Congress had unambiguously conditioned the states'
receipt of the money on compliance with section 6010.
The Court stated that, while other sections of the Act clearly
conditioned receipt of money under the program on adherence to
specific requirements,5 3 section 6010 did not use the same type of
conditional language. 54 The Court thus saw section 6010 as having
55
a "limited meaning.",

The Court also noted the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' interpretation of the Act: " 'No authority was included in
[the 1975] Act to allow the Department to withhold funds from
States on the basis of failure to meet the findings [of section
6010].' ",56 The Court determined that an inability to terminate
funds showed that there was no explicit condition on the states'
57
receipt of funds under the Act.
In Pennhurst the Court also analyzed the amount of money that
had been allocated to the State of Pennsylvania under the Act. 58
53. Id. at 1542. The Court compared section 6010 with section 6005 (conditioning funding or.
employment of the handicapped), section 6009 (conditioning funding on the development of a system
to evaluate services), section 6011 (conditioning funding on the state providing the Secretary with
assurances that there is a habilitation plan on each disabled person who receives services), section
6012 (conditioning funding on the establishment of a system to protect and advocate the rights of the
disabled), section 6063 (conditioning funding on approval of a state plan for the provision of services
and facilities), and section 6067 (conditioning funding on the establishment of a state Planning
Council). 42 U.S.C.A. S 6005 (West 1977); id. S 6009, 6011 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981); id. § 6012,
6063, 6067 (West Supp. 1981).
54. 101 S. Ct. at 1542.
55. Id. BothJustice Blackmun in his concurrence and Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan in
dissent concluded that section 6010 has greater meaning than that given it by the majority. Id. at
1547 (Blackmun, .J., concurring); id. at 1549 (White, Brennan & Marshall, .J.., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun relied on the cross-reference in section 6063 to rights articulated in section 6010. Section
6063 provides in part as follows:
(5)(C) The plan must contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the
Secretary that the human rights of all persons with developmerital disabilities
(especially those persons without familial protection) who are receiving treatment,
services, or habilitation under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected
consistent with section 6010 of this title (relating to rights of the developmentally
disabled).
42 U.S.C.A. S 6063(b) (5) (C) (West Supp. 1981).
Justice Blackmun noted that "[al perfectly reasonable judicial interpretation of § 6010, which
would avoid the odd and perhaps dangerous precedent of ascribing no meaning to a congressional
enactment, would observe and give effect to the linkage between S 6010 and 5 6063." 101 S. Ct. at
1547.
The dissent concluded that Congress had, pursuant to its spending power, "intended § 6010,
although couched in terms of rights, to serve as requirements that the participating States must
observe in receiving federal funds under the provisions of the Act." Id. at 1549 (White, Brennan &
Marshall, .JJ., dissenting).
56. 101 S. Ct. at 1543 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 31,006 (May 9, 1980)). The Court rejected the
Secretary's subsequent comment in the Federal Register that the 1978 amendments to the Act
required recipients of funds to provide assurances that they would comply with the provisions of
section 6010 and that "[qailure to comply with the assurance may result in the loss of Federal
Funds." 45 Fed. Reg. 31,006 (May 9, 1980).
In a footnote, the Court indicated that the Secretary's interpretation might be too expansive.
The Court also pointed out that the Secretary had not withheld funds from Pennsylvania for
noncompliance. 101 S. Ct. at 1543 n.17.
57. Id. at 1543. The Court noted that the Conference Committee had rejected the Senate's plan
to terminate funding for failure to comply with the Senate's bill of rights. Id.
58. Id.
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The Court termed the 1976 grant of 1.6 million dollars "woefully
inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing
'appropriate' treatment in the 'least restrictive' setting.' 59
According to the Court this failure to provide adequate funding was
an indication that Congress did not impose a "massive obligation
on participating states,"
to provide certain rights to the
6 0
.
disabled
developmentally
The Pennhurst Court also indicated that the states could not
knowingly accept the obligation of providing "appropriate
treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment because of the
vagueness of the terms of the Act. 61 If such an obligation were
enforced by the Court, it would amount to placing a retroactive
Court did not believe was
obligation on the states, something the 62
encompassed under the spending power.
Finally, the Court commented on the section 6010
"conditions" as compared with other sections of the Act that
explicitly imposed conditions. 63 The Court in Pennhurst found that
the sections that were explicitly conditional would be unnecessary if
section 6010 were read as placing affirmative obligations on the
states. 64 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress intended to
encourage only the development of state programs and did not act
65
to impose affirmative obligations on the states.
59. Id.
60. Id.The Court noted, "When Congress does impose affirmative obligations on the States, it
usually makes a far more substantial contribution to defray costs." Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 100
S. Ct. 2758 (1980)).
61. Id. The Secretary's statement that the Act did not provide any authority to withhold funds
from the states persuaded the Court that the state's acceptance of the funds would be with the
understanding that there were no conditions (with respect to section 6010) on receipt of the funds. Id.
at 1543.
62. Id. at 1544. The Court indicated that although Congress has broad powers under the
spending clause, "it does not include surprising participating States with post-acceptance or
'retroactive' conditions." Id.
63. Id. The Court compared section 6010 with sections 6011, 6063(b) (5) (C), and 6062(a) (4).
Section 6011 provides that habilitation plans must be developed on each disabled person. 42
U.S.C.A. § 6011 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). Section 6063(b) (5) (C) provides that the plan must be
consistent with section 6010. Id. § 6063(b) (5) (C) (West Supp. 1981). Section 6062(a) (4) provided in
the original Act that 30% of the funds received under the Act should be used to deinstitutionalize the
developmentally disabled. Id. § 6062(a)(4) (West 1977) (repealed 1978)_
64. 101 S. Ct. at 1544. The Court noted that section 6011 required habilitation plans only when
federal funds from the Act were used in the habilitation of the disabled person, a requirement that
would be unnecessary since section 6010 was read as mandating such plans in all cases. Id.The
Court also noted that section 6063(b) (5) (C) would be superfluous if section 6010 mandated
compliance with its provisions. Id.
The Court noted differences between section 6010 as interpreted and section 6062(a)(4).
Section 6062(a) (4) required that 30% of the funds be used for deinstitutionalization, a sum the
Court found inconsistent with a mandate to deinstitutionalize under section 6010. Id.
65. Id. The Court was persuaded by its earlier decision in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In that case the issue was whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 forbade a professional school from imposing physical qualifications for admission to a clinical
training program. The Court found that there was no congressional intent to impose an affirmative
action obligation on all the recipients of the funds. Instead, Congress only encouraged some
recipients, while imposing an explicit obligation on others. 442 U.S. at 410.
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After deciding that section 6010 was not a mandatory
obligation on the states, the Court discussed whether the plaintiffs
could bring suit to compel compliance with those sections of the Act
that did place conditions on the states. 66 The Court first decided
that "[in legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Power, the
typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed
conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but
rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the
State. '67
In its analysis of whether the residents of Pennhurst could
enforce a private claim the Pennhurst Court looked to Maine v.
Thiboutot.68 Without

deciding whether Thiboutot controlled, the

Court noted that the plaintiffs in Thiboutot and Pennhurst might be
enforcing different rights, 69 and that there was a question as to
whether the remedy in the Act was exclusive. 7 0 Thus, the case was
remanded to the court of appeals for a decision as to whether a
private cause of action exists. 7 1 The Court also remanded the issue
of whether Pennhurst qualified as a "program assisted" under
section 6063(b) (5) (C) or section 601172 since it was the State of

Pennsylvania and not Pennhurst that received the funds under the
Act.

73

66. 101 S. Ct. at 1545. A major concern in this area is whether a private cause of action exists to
enforce the statutory provisions that specifically place conditions on the states. The Court concluded
that it was unnecessary to determine whether a private cause of action existed under section 6010 or
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 because of its decision that section 6010 provided no substantive rights. Id.
at 1545 n.21. This was consistent with the decision in Southeastern Community College v.Davis, in which
the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a private cause of action existed under section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or42 U.S.C. § 1983. 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 1545.
68. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). The Thiboutot court held that 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 created a private cause of
action based solely on statutory violations of federal law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 8.
69. 101 S. Ct. at 1545. In Thiboutot the plaintiff alleged that Maine's laws deprived him of
welfare benefits to which he was entitled. In Pennhurst, however, the Court asserted that the plaintiffs
could claim only that the state had failed to provide the Secretary with the adequate assurances
referred to in section 6063(b) (5) (C). Id.
70. Id. The Court referred to.|ustice Powell's dissent in Thiboutot which "suggested that S 1983
would not be available where the 'governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of
[its terms].' " Id.(quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1.22 n.11 (Powell, ..
, dissenting)).
71. 101 S. Ct. at 1546. On remand, the court will have to determine whether the assurances
required under section 6063(b) (5) (C) are a " 'right secured' .
within the meaning of 5 1983." Id.
at 1545.
72. Id. The dissent concluded that Pennhurst could qualify as a program assisted even though it
did not receive funds, because Pennsylvania did receive funds under the Act. Id. at 1552 (White,
Brennan & Marshall, .[..,
dissenting). The dissent stated as follows:
These funds will necessarily be supporting Pennsylvania's "programs" for providing
treatment, services or habilitation within the meaning of S 6063(b) (5) (C); and under
the express terms of that section, Pennsylvania is required to respect the S 6010 rights
of the developmentally disabled in its state institutions, including Pennhurst, and to
give the Secretary adequate assurances in this respect. This is true whether or not
Pennhurst itself directly receives any share of the state's allocation.
Id.
73. Id. at 1546. On remand, the court will have to find that the funds given to Pennsylvania
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Next, the Court considered the question of the plaintiffs'
possible remedy. The Court noted that in prior decisions regarding
federal-state conflicts, relief had been limited to offering the state
the alternative of complying with federal statutes or losing federal
funds, 74 or enjoining a state from enforcing a provision in conflict
with federal law. 7 5 The Court remanded the issue to the court of
appeals,7 6 pointing out that there had been no cases in which a state
had been required to take on such massive financial obligations as
would be required in the Pennhurstcase. 7 7
The Court's final consideration was whether Pennsylvania law
imposed an obligation on the state to provide appropriate
treatment in the "least restrictive" environment.7 8 The Court held
that this issue must be remanded because the district court's
decision on the state law might "have been colored by its holding
with respect to section 6010, "9 and because the district court held
only that there was a state right to treatment and not to treatment
in the "least restrictive" environment. 80
There are several implications of the Pennhurst decision. First,
the Court left open the issue of a constitutional right to treatment in
the "least restrictive" environment. 8 ' The Third Circuit, which
will hear the remand, has recently decided another case, Romeo v.
Youngberg,82 in which a limited constitutional right to the least
intrusive treatment was found. 3 If the Romeo v. Youngberg decision
have an effect on the habilitation given at Pennhurst before the plaintiffs can claim enforceable
violations of the Act. Id.
74. Id. (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1970)).
75. 101 S. Ct. at 1546 (citing Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972)).
76. 101 S. Ct. at 1546.
77. Id.
78. Id. Section 4201 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
provides in part:
The department shall have power, and its duty shall be:
(1)To assure within the State the availability and equitable provision of adequate
mental health and mental retardation services for all persons who need them,
regardless of religion, race, color, natural origin, settlement, residence, or economic
or social status.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1969).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 1546.
80. Id. The Court also remanded issues which had not been considered by the circuit court.
These issues were plaintiff's federal constitutional claims and the claims under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1547.
81. Id. The Court did not address the constitutional questions because the circuit did not rule on
those questions. Id.
82. 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981).
83. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 169 (3d. Cir. 1980). The circuit court decided that in
the absence of care or when using highly intrusive procedures, the state must show a compelling
necessity in order for the procedures to be constitutionally permissible. There is a more flexible
standard of.judicial review, including suitable deference to medical opinion, when considering a
right to adequate treatment. Id. at 159.
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is affirmed by the Supreme Court, institutions for the mentally
retarded in the United States would have to take significant steps to
provide community living arrangements for their residents.

The Pennhurst decision will probably signal the end of reliance
on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act

8
as a method of deinstitutionalizing the mentally retarded.
Advocates of deinstitutionalization, however, may be able to
accomplish their goals through reliance on section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The potential problem with relying on section
504 is that the Supreme Court has not recognized a private cause of
action under section 504, even though it had the opportunity to do
so in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.8 15 In addition, as Justice
Blackmun pointed out in his concurring opinion to Pennhurst, with
respect to a private action, "[tihe court ... seems to mestrongly to
4

intimate that it will not view kindly any future positive holding in
that direction. ''86
The Pennhurst decision appears to provide advocates of
deinstitutionalization grounds for optimism in just one area:
protection of rights through state law. The Court remanded for
consideration in this area only because the district court's decision
may have been "colored" by the holding on section 6010 and
because the court did not identify the statute as an independent and
adequate ground for the decision. 8 7 The Court, however, did not
add any caveats as to problems with such a course, as they had done
in other areas. 88 Thus, for states which have legislated in this
area, 89 the door may be open to enforcement of state rights.
A suit seeking habilitation in the least restrictive environment
has been filed in North Dakota. 90 The suit relies not only on the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, but
84. See 5 MENTAL DISABILITIES LAW REPORTER 139 (1981). Commentators have noted that
section 6010 will no longer be interpreted by states as mandating habilitation in the least restrictive
environment. Thus, "the best the plaintiffs can hope for under the DD (Developmentally Disabled)
Act is a subsequent interpretation of the remaining provisions, particularly section 6011 and section
6063, that will mandate privately enforceable rights of some kind." Id.
85. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
86. 101 S. Ct. at 1547 (Blackmun, .j., concurring). The three dissenting Justices, White,
Brennan, and Marshall, concluded that a private cause of action did exist. Id. at 1557.
87. Id. at 1546.
88. Id. at 1546-47. The Court suggested that a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
regarding habilitation rights, In re.loseph Schmidt, _
Pa. , 425 A.2d 393 (1981), could be
considered on remand. Id. at 1547 n.24.
89. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-01.2-02 (1981). North Dakota recently enacted a statute
regarding treatment of the developmentally disabled. It states that "[aill persons with developmental
Jisabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for those disabilities.
Treatment, services, and habilitation for developmentally disabled persons shall be provided in the
least restrictive appropriate setting." Id.
90. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Link, No. Al 80-141 (D.N.D., filed
Sept. 26, 1980).
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also on constitutional provisions, 9 1 the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,92 the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 91

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent that the suit relies on section
6010, the Pennhurst decision would seem to limit the plaintiffs'
remedies. However, the Pennhurst decision left open the possibility
of recovery under the Rehabilitation Act of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 9 4
Thus, because of the additional basis for the claims in the North
Dakota suit, the Pennhurst decision may have a minimal effect on
the plaintiffs' position.
It has been said of the Pennhurst decision that "[ijn many
ways, this very limited decision simply muddies the water,
providing the states and developmentally disabled people with
minimal
guidance
for
making
immediate
policy
9 The Court,
recommendations. '"
however, has indicated that in
determining the scope of a statute, no obligation will be enforced
unless Congress explicitly requires it. Any rights for the retarded to
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, therefore, must be
found outside the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act.
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91. Plaintiffs' complaint at 3, Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Link, No.
Al 80-141 (D.N.D., filed Sept. 26, 1980). The plaintiffs claim violations of the first, fourth, fifth,
eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. Id.
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1981).
93. 20 U.S.C.A. §5 1401-1461 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981).
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1545 n.21, 1547.
95. 5 MENTAL DiSABtITY LAW REPORTER 139. The commentator noted that the Court's decision
was limited to questions regarding section 6010, and that questions regarding other parts of the Act
and other means of attack were left to be answered on remand. Id. at 139, 141.

